ABSTRACT. This paper examines the extent of variation 
I. INTRODUCTION
That the stringency of environmental regulation varies spatially in the United States hardly seems a noteworthy point anymore. It is rather well established that states exercise discretion in their enforcement of federal environmental regulations, and states can of course adopt standards that are more stringent than those promulgated by the federal government. Over the past couple of decades, a number of different proxies that attempt to measure the extent of these regulatory differences between states have been constructed and subsequently used by researchers wishing to explore the impact of environmental regulations on industrial location and industrial activity (see Levinson 2001 and Brunnermeier and Levinson 2004 for reviews) .
What is less well studied and less appreciated is the degree of heterogeneity in regulatory stringency below the state level. Duffy-Deno (1992) uses the variation in pol-lution abatement expenditures across Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) to examine the effects of environmental regulations on economic activity, but-with only 63 SMSAs-this analysis is not much richer than a state-level study, and it obviously excludes a good deal of economic activity. Berman and Bui (2001) examine the impact on oil refineries of the uniquely stringent air quality regulations of the South Coast Air Basin (i.e., the Los Angeles area) versus those of the rest of California and the rest of the United States. Meanwhile, a growing number of studies have looked at the effects county nonattainment of the Clean Air Act's national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) have had on manufacturing activity (e.g., McConnell and Schwab 1990; Henderson 1996; Kahn 1997; Becker and Henderson 2000; Greenstone 2002; List et al. 2003) . While county-level NAAQS nonattainment statuses may be the best, most geographically detailed measures of environmental regulation currently available, they cover only six air pollutants, and they are dichotomous (rather than continuous) in nature, thereby cloaking the true variation in regulatory intensity across counties, even within a state.
In this paper, I employ a unique database to measure and examine more fully the extent of variation in regulatory stringency below the state level. In particular, I use 14 years' worth of establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey to estimate a county-level index of environmental compliance costs, as well as a comparable statelevel index. Here, pollution abatement operating costs per unit of economic activity (output or employment) is modeled as a func-tion of plants' industry, size, age, and yearfactors known to determine both regulatory scrutiny and environmental expenditures-as well as plants' location. The resulting index captures extranormal environmental costs at a detailed level of geography, due (if only in part) to additional environmental regulation faced by industry at the locale.
Results suggest that spatial heterogeneity in environmental compliance costs is real. County-level variation is found to explain 11 to 18 times more of the variation in environmental compliance costs than state-level variation alone, and the range of environmental compliance costs within a state is often large. I find that at least 34% of counties (containing 21% of U.S. manufacturing employment) have environmental compliance costs that are statistically different from their states'. Alternative specifications yield more dramatic results. All told, there are only three states with counties with homogenous environmental compliance costs (in a statistical sense). These results suggest that important spatial variation is lost in state-level studies of environmental regulation.
II. A COUNTY-LEVEL INDEX OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE COSTS
The literature is full of studies that have used pollution abatement expenditure data from the PACE survey to measure geographic differences in the stringency of environmental regulations. 1 At the heart of each of these measures is an estimate of pollution abatement expenditures, divided by some measure of total manufacturing activity, such as gross state product, value added, or value of shipments. In recognition of the inherent variation in the pollution-intensiveness of industries, some measures attempt to adjust for a location's industrial composition (e.g., Bartik 1988; Levinson 1996; Gray 1997; Levinson 2001; Keller and Levinson 2002) ; others do not (e.g., Duffy-Deno 1992; Friedman, Ger-1 The principal alternatives to such cost-based measures are various indexes and rankings produced by environmental organizations, which are often considered to be subjective in nature. See Levinson (2001) for a review and discussion. lowski, and Silberman 1992; List and Kunce 2000; List and Co 2000) . With the exception of Levinson (1996) , all of these previous studies have used published PACE statistics (U.S. Bureau of the Census, various years), versus the underlying establishment-level microdata. And with the exception of DuffyDeno (1992) , who analyzed 63 SMSAs, the unit of geography is the state in all of these studies.
In this paper, I use the establishment-level data from the PACE survey. 2 For my purposes, these microdata have a few substantial advantages over the published PACE statistics that are commonly used. First and foremost, the location information associated with each establishment allows me to contemplate pollution abatement expenditure at the substate level. Second, the industrial classification of establishments in these data is the most detailed available, by any level of geography, which is extremely valuable in any effort to explain variation in pollution abatement expenditures. Finally, by merging these PACE microdata to information reported by these same establishments in the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) and the Census of Manufactures (CM), I am uniquely able to control for the size and age of establishments-factors that have been shown to be important determinants of regulatory scrutiny and, hence, establishments' compliance expenditures (e.g., Becker and Henderson 2001; Becker 2005) . By controlling for establishment size, I also control for economies of scale in abatement.
Here I use the establishment-level data from the PACE surveys of 1979-1982, 1984-1986, and 1988-1994. 3 As in most of the 2 These survey data, as well as those from the Annual Survey of Manufactures and the Census of Manufactures, are confidential, collected and protected under Title 13 of the U.S. Code. Restricted access to these data can be arranged through the U.S. Census Bureau's Center for Economic Studies. See www.ces.census.gov/ for details. 3 The collection of these data began with 1973. The establishment-level data from 1974 to 1978 have only recently been uncovered and are not employed here. Establishmentlevel data from 1973 and 1983 are still missing. A survey for reference year 1987 was not conducted. The PACE survey was suspended over the past decade and a half (1995-1998, 2000-2004, 2006-present) , though it is hoped that annual collection will soon resume. The usefulness of the aforementioned studies, I will employ data on total pollution abatement operating costs (PAOC), which includes salaries and wages, parts and materials, fuel and electricity, capital depreciation, contract work, equipment leasing, and other operating costs associated with a plant's abatement of its air and water pollution as well as its solid waste in that calendar year. To this I merge data on these establishments from the ASM or CM, including employment, value of shipments, fourdigit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry, county, and plant vintage (as measured by an establishment's first appearance in the CM). 4 After restricting the sample to cases that had linkable PACE and ASM/CM records in a given year, and after eliminating inactive establishments, plants in Alaska and Hawaii, and those with missing or incomplete data on critical items, there are 200,532 establishment-years of observations for my empirical work. This rather sizable sample contains approximately 49,000 unique manufacturing plants, encompassing virtually all four-digit SIC manufacturing industries and located in 2,514 different U.S. counties.
In harmony with the previous literature, the basis for my index is an establishment's PAOC intensity-that is, its pollution abatement operating costs per unit of economic activity. In this paper, I mainly use as the denominator a plant's output, namely, its value of shipments (VS). Previous studies (cited above) have also used gross product, value added, or value of shipments. Later in the paper, I discuss some results from alternate specifications that instead use plant employment (EMP) as their denominator.
The degree of regulatory scrutiny faced by a manufacturing plant-and hence its PAOC data from the 1999 PACE survey is rather limited (see Becker and Shadbegian 2005) . The recently released data for reference year 2005 are also not employed here. 4 The CM contains the entire universe of manufacturing establishments and is conducted in years ending in "2" and "7." Meanwhile, the ASM is an annual survey in which larger establishments in an industry are oversampled, in an effort to maximize coverage for a given sample size. (The PACE sample, in turn, is largely a subset of the ASM sample.) While the ASM consists of a series of 5-year panels, I do not utilize the panel nature of the ASM here. Instead, as is common, I treat these data as repeated cross-sections. intensity-is most certainly dependent on the industry it is in (its inherent pollution-intensiveness), as well as the year and its size, and it has been shown that the combination of these three factors can affect regulatory intensity (Becker and Henderson 2000) . Accordingly, I model PAOC intensity as a function of an industry-year-size quartile effect. In lieu of an overwhelming number of dummy variables (of which there would be over 21,000), I employ the data at hand to compute an estimate of the expected PAOC intensity for each industry-year-size quartile class. In particular, for an establishment in industry nЈ, year tЈ, and size quartile qЈ, the relevant PAOC intensity is assumed to be 5 median (PAOC / VS ).
[1]
Here, an establishment's size quartile is determined by its position in the employmentweighted plant employment distribution for its industry in that period. 6 In principle, a plant's age category could be a fourth dimension used in computing an establishment's expected PAOC intensity in equation [1] , but this would significantly increase the number of applicable cells and severely reduce the average number of observations per cell. Instead, establishment age is controlled for by a separate series of plant vintage indicators (V k ) based on an establishment's first appearance in the CM, with k {1963, 1967 CM, with k {1963, , 1972 CM, with k {1963, , 1977 CM, with k {1963, , 1982 CM, with k {1963, , 1987 CM, with k {1963, , ʦ 1992 . It is therefore assumed that plant vintage has equivalent effects on regulation 5 Alternatives to this include the PAOC intensity of the mean establishment in the set {nЈ, tЈ, qЈ} or the weighted mean. These will be explored below.
6 That is, the interquartile cutoffs are chosen so that each quartile contains one-fourth of the industry's employment, rather than one-fourth of its establishments. I conjecture that this grouping more closely approximates the manner in which regulators prioritize their scrutiny of plants within an industry. Because the PACE and ASM sample larger establishments more heavily, the distribution across these size quartiles in this sample is more uniform than it might be, with 18.8%, 26.9%, 29.8%, and 24.5% in the quartiles with the largest to smallest plants, respectively. Data on an industry's plant employment distribution is taken from the prior or contemporaneous CM and therefore utilizes the universe of establishments within an industry. and environmental compliance costs across industry, year, and size classes. 7 My county-level index of environmental compliance costs is the vector of paramm eters from the following regression equation:
where observation i is an establishment in industry nЈ, year tЈ, size quartile qЈ, and j also indexes establishments in the sample. K is the set of possible first CM appearances, less one omitted possibility (1963) . M is the set of U.S. counties, m indexes those counties, and C m is one in a series of county indicator variables, less one omitted county (Washington, D.C.). is an error term.
A comparable state-level index can be estimated from a version of equation [2] with in place of
where S is the set of U.S. states, s indexes those states, and C s is one in a series of state indicator variables, less one omitted state (again, Washington, D.C.). Note that since the same omitted category is employed in both specifications (i.e., establishments in the "county" and "state" of Washington, D.C., that were in existence as early as the 1963 CM), the county-and state-level indexes are identically scaled and directly comparable. Since the value of the dependent variable is bounded from below for a significant number of observations, the parameters of equation [2] are estimated via a Tobit specification. 8 The parameter is the estimated ␣ 7 Demonstrating whether this is indeed the case is beyond the scope of this current paper. It should be noted that any use of plant vintage here is more than has been (or could be) done by any previous study.
8 Establishments are asked to report their expenditures in thousands of dollars. Therefore, with rounding, a response of zero reflects expenditures of less than $500. The cnreg (censored normal regression) command in Stata is a generalization of the standard Tobit procedure that allows the censoring point to vary by observation. In this case, left-censoring occurs at ln(0.5/VS i ) for about 18% of the observations in this sample. constant, representing the omitted group (establishments in Washington, D.C., that were in existence as early as the 1963 CM). In estimation, is restricted to be equal to one, ␤ forcing the notion that an establishment is expected to have PAOC intensity equivalent to the estimate for its industry-year-size class, as specified in equation [1] . Deviations from this are explained by differences in plant vintage, as captured by the parameters, 9 and by dif-␥ k ferences between counties, as measured by the estimated parameters-the county-level m index. The index, assumed here to be time invariant, reveals any extranormal environmental compliance costs, due to above-or below-normal environmental regulation faced by manufacturers at the county level. The index also includes potential geographic differences in prices related to pollution abatement, such as the salaries of environmental workers, cost of low-sulfur coal, price of electricity, fees for solid waste hauling and disposal, and so forth. Exploring the variation in this index is the subject of the next section. 10 Note that the percentage difference in PAOC intensity between any two geographic units (for plants in the same industry, year, size quartile, and age category) is given by (
I briefly present some statistics, to convey a general sense for the dependent variable here. According to data published by the U.S. Census Bureau, during the period under study here, manufacturing-wide PAOC intensity 9 Regressions show that, other things being equal, establishments of older vintages have higher PAOC intensity. This seems to suggest that, on average across all industries, in the time period under study here, the abatement of pollution was more labor-, material-, and/or energy-intensive in older establishments, perhaps because their capital equipment (for both production and pollution abatement) was less modern and less efficient.
10 A question is whether the most polluting industries (as measured by PAOC intensity) account for most of the variation here. In fact, there is little correlation (positive or negative) between an industry's PAOC intensity and its share of the total variation in PAOC intensity. Furthermore, the top 10% of industries (n ‫ס‬ 45) in terms of PAOC intensity account for 10% of the total variation, 18% of the manufacturing sector's total value of shipments over this period, and 8% of its employment. This suggests that industries across the spectrum of pollution intensity are behind the variation in this index. Note: Placebo #1 consists of the baseline model (with no geography variables), plus dummy variables based on the first letter of the name of the county in which the establishment is located. Placebo #2 consists of the baseline model, plus dummy variables based on the first letter of the name of the county in which the establishment is located and the last digit of the establishment's total employment. Placebo #3 consists of the baseline model, plus dummy variables based on the first letter of the name of the county in which the establishment is located and the last two digits of the establishment's total employment. OLS, ordinary least squares.
(i.e., PAOC expenditure as a share of total value of shipments) ranged from 0.43% in 1979 (the first year here) to 0.61% in 1991. The typical manufacturing industry has PAOC intensity less than that (and a number have essentially zero PAOC expenditure), while others have substantially more. According to published data, during this time period, the maximum industry-level PAOC intensity was typically 4% to 6%, with various industries having held the distinction of being the most PAOC intensive, including alkalies and chlorine, inorganic pigments, primary lead, primary copper, plating and polishing, ordnance and accessories, pulp mills, and cellulosic manmade fibers. Meanwhile, the pattern of PAOC intensity by size quartile varies quite a bit by industry. While monotonically decreasing and monotonically increasing PAOC intensity are the two most common patterns, four-fifths of industries exhibit something else. This is consistent with Becker (2005) , who found that the impact of Clean Air Act regulation on air pollution abatement costs also varied by establishment size and that the pattern varied by air pollutant.
III. ON SPATIAL HETEROGENEITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE COSTS
I begin by noting that, according to the respective pseudo-R 2 statistics, as seen in Table  1 , the county dummy variables in equation [2] explain over 18 times more of the variation in excess PAOC intensity than a version of equation [2] with state dummy variables in their place, relative to a model with no geography variables at all. The R 2 statistics from the analogous ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions tell a similar story. Here, the county dummy variables explain over 13 times more of the variation in excess PAOC intensity than do state dummy variables. Even the adjusted-R 2 statistics suggest that county variation explains 11 times more of the variation in excess PAOC intensity than state variation, relative to a model without any geographic controls. Table 1 also presents the R 2 statistics from three "placebo" specifications that address the possibility that a large set of meaningless dummy variables might also explain variation in PAOC intensity. In the Placebo #1 specification, 25 meaningless dummy variables are included, based on the first letter of the name of the county in which the establishment is located. In the Placebo #2 [#3] specification, 243 [2,403] meaningless dummy variables are included, based on the first letter of the name of the county in which the establishment is located and the last digit [last two digits] of the establishment's total employment. The results suggest that these meaningless dummies indeed add explanatory power, relative to the baseline model with no geography variables. For example, in the case of Placebo #3, the 2,403 dummy variables add 2.9% to the pseudo-R 2 . However this is far less than the 10.4% that the 2,513 county dummy variables add. These results clearly demonstrate that (1) geography-whether state or county-explains some portion of environmental compliance costs, and (2) collectively, counties have substantially more explanatory power than do states, on the matter of environmental compliance costs. Table 2 begins to illustrate the degree of heterogeneity in environmental compliance costs within each of the 48 states in the scope of this analysis. In particular, I present three statistics here: The first is the range (Range) of the index values in the state, that is, the difference in the index values between the counties with the maximum and minimum index value. The second is the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of the index values in the state, that is, the average deviation of the county indexes from the average of the indexes. The third is the standard deviation (SD) of the index values in the state. While computing these three statistics, it was necessary for me to ignore the index values of 571 counties, for confidentiality reasons. 11 The measures reported in Table 2 therefore may understate the true degree of heterogeneity observed in the state. 12 Nonetheless, the values presented in Table 2 are fairly correlated with their true values (calculated without these suppressions): For Range the pairwise and Spearman's rank correlations are 0.6441 and 0.6818, respectively; for MAD those two correlations are 0.5423 and 0.5774, respectively; and for SD those two correlations are 0.5780 and 0.5774, respectively. A state's rank (highest value ‫ס‬ 1) is also shown in Table 2 for each of these three measures.
We see that the state with the highest Range is Oklahoma, where the difference in the maximum and minimum county-level index value is almost 8 points. In terms of MAD, the state with the highest value is New Mexico, where the average county index is 1.3 points from the mean index in the state. New Mexico also has the largest SD. In terms of both MAD and SD, Oklahoma ranks second. Meanwhile, Delaware ranks lowest in all three measures, with Connecticut, Utah, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New Hampshire also exhibiting relatively low levels of heterogeneity.
While a full exploration of the state-level determinants of this heterogeneity is beyond the scope of this current paper, casual observation suggests that the states with the lowest Range, MAD, and SD (and therefore the least heterogeneity among their counties) tend to be northeastern states, and they tend to have the smallest land area, highest population density, and smallest number of counties. To examine whether there are such relationships, Table 3 presents the pairwise correlation coefficients between MAD, SD, Range, land area, population density, and number of counties. The table also contains correlations with a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of county population (since population concentrated in relatively few counties may concentrate political power and lead to homogeneity) and with the states' environmental compliance cost index. The table confirms casual observation. Heterogeneity is indeed positively correlated with states' land area and number of counties, and negatively correlated with states' population density, HHI, and environmental compliance cost index value.
Since these state characteristics are also usually significantly correlated with each other, a simple OLS regression is used to examine their independent impacts on heterogeneity. Table 4 reveals that, controlling for the other state characteristics, population density is the only statistically significant determinant of MAD. Exactly why heterogeneity tends to be highest in the least densely populated states-and whether this is perhaps picking up omitted variables-is worth future investigation. Meanwhile, of the set of state characteristics examined here, none are found to be a statistically significant determinant of SD. In terms of Range, only the number of counties is found to be statistically significant. The likely explanation here is that, controlling for land area, states with a large number of counties tend to have fewer plants per county, leading to more imprecisely measured index values, including ones that fall toward and be- come the minimum and maximum in the state.
We will see this in graphical form shortly. Returning to Table 2 , among large manufacturing states (in terms of employment), Texas exhibits the largest degree of heterogeneity, measured by Range (6.5), MAD (0.65), or SD (0.94). Michigan also has relatively high heterogeneity, with a Range, MAD, To help further illustrate heterogeneity, Figure 1 plots the county-and state-level index values for Texas, Michigan, and California, respectively. One particularly nice feature of these graphs is their depiction of the confidence intervals around the state and county point estimates. 14 This makes obvious the fact that many of the counties toward the extrema are clearly statistically different from their respective states, in terms of the environmental compliance costs faced by their manufacturing establishments. What is less obvious here is whether the many counties with confidence squared errors from the county-and statebased regression models, respectively. The corresponding 90% confidence interval is thereforê(
which is easily computed from standard regression output. Table 5 summarizes the results of this statistical testing. 15 Overall, I find that 855 (34.0%) of the 2,513 counties in these 48 states have an environmental compliance cost index statistically different (at the 10% level) from the index of their respective state. These 855 counties contained 21% of U.S. manufacturing employment and 21% of U.S. manufacturing establishments in 2002. 16, 17 I find that 546 (21.7%) of the 2,513 counties have an environmental compliance cost index statistically higher than the index of their respective state, while 309 (12.3%) have an index statistically lower than the index of their state. These two groups contained 10.6% and 10.4% of U.S. manufacturing employment, respectively. Table 6 lists the largest of these counties (ranked by their 2002 manufacturing employment) and the direction of their difference vis-à-vis their state. Note that this list 15 Counties for which a standard error could not be estimated are assumed to be not statistically different than their state. A small number of underlying observations appears to be the primary reason why standard errors could not be estimated. There are 111 such counties, containing just 0.3% of U.S. manufacturing employment in 2002. 16 Note that these states also have about 600 counties not in my sample and therefore without an index value. These counties accounted for just 0.5% of the manufacturing employment in these states. 17 At the 5% level of significance, 714 counties (28.4%), containing 15% of U.S. manufacturing employment in 2002, have an environmental compliance cost index statistically different from the index of their respective state. At the 1% level of significance, 547 counties (21.8%), containing 6.3% of U.S. manufacturing employment in 2002, have an environmental compliance cost index statistically different from the index of their respective state.
includes major counties in New York City, Chicago, San Francisco, Detroit, Dallas, and other large cities. Table 7 shows the states with the highest and lowest percentage of their counties that are statistically different from the state. We see that Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Delaware exhibit no heterogeneity whatsoever (from a statistical standpoint). At the other extreme, nearly two-thirds of Nebraska's counties are different from their state-level index, followed closely by Montana. Earlier we noted that Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas were among those with the largest Range, MAD, and SD, and all three appear here in the top 10, which is not necessarily surprising.
In Figure 2 , I present county maps for five large manufacturing states that figure prominently in Tables 2 and 6 : Texas, Michigan, California, New York, and New Jersey. Here, counties are grouped (and shaded) by whether their index value is statistically smaller than the state's index (light gray), statistically indistinguishable (medium gray), or statistically larger than the state's index (black). Counties with no data or with an index value suppressed for confidentiality reasons are also depicted (white).
The maps in Figure 2 allow for some casual observation. One potentially interesting question is whether there is any clustering of "high" and "low" index values within a state. This could arise for a number of reasons, for example, adjacent counties may share the same set of state regulators and/or nearby counties may regulate themselves similarly, to avoid interjurisdictional competition. It has also been shown that environmental regulation may be more lax where exposure to emissions is more likely to fall outside the state, such as in border counties, and particularly those on a state's eastern edge (Helland and Whitford 2003) .
In Texas, there doesn't appear to be any clustering of counties with high index values, or of counties with low index values-a few Dallas-Fort Worth counties being an exception. In Michigan, the counties with high index values are chiefly nonmetropolitan counties, and a cluster of two counties with low index values appear in Detroit. In California, there is a cluster of high index counties east of San Francisco, and a cluster of low index counties just south of San Francisco. In New York, a couple of low index counties appear in New York City, while many of New York's other large cities (Buffalo, Albany/ Troy, Syracuse) have high index values. Moreover, 6 of the 14 Finger Lakes counties have high index values and none have a low index value. Finally, New Jersey's three lowindex counties are all clustered in the New York City area. Future analyses could explore whether clustering (to the extent it appears here) is an actual phenomenon or occurs merely by chance.
IV. RESULTS FROM ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
Here, I briefly explore alternate specifications for the index. In particular, I examine two choices. One is the option of using the mean or weighted mean in computing expected PAOC intensity, instead of median, in equations [1] and [2] . There seems no compelling reason to prefer one over the other two. The other choice is the option of using plant employment (EMP) in the denominator of PAOC intensity (and expected PAOC intensity), instead of value of shipments (VS). While the use of VS has precedence in the literature, the PAOC i /EMP i ratio might be said to encapsulate a regulator's implicit choice between environmental protection and jobs. Environmental regulation may impact EMP more than VS.
Comparing the county-level indexes using the median, mean, and weighted mean, I find the pairwise correlations are never less than 0.989 and the Spearman's rank correlations are never less than 0.928. Indexes using the mean and weighted mean are the most closely correlated, with Spearman's rank correlations of 0.988 and 0.997, for the VS-and EMPbased indexes, respectively. Comparing the various VS-and EMP-based indexes, pairwise correlations range from 0.984 to 0.994, and the Spearman's rank correlations range from 0.881 to 0.948.
Clearly, the index is very robust to the choices of median, mean, weighted mean, VS, and EMP, but the correlations are not perfect. To further examine the similarities and differ-FIGURE 1 Heterogeneity in Environmental Compliance Costs: Three Examples ences between these alternate indexes, I calculate the number of counties that have an index value that is statistically different (higher and lower) from the index value of the respective state. Table 8 presents the results. Several points are worth making. First, the particular index used and discussed in the previous sections of this paper (i.e., using VS and median; labeled Specification #1) is the most "conservative" of the six, in terms of the number of counties that are statistically different from their state (855). This was a deliberate Counties that are not in the sample 597 0.5 1.2 choice on my part. Second, mean and weighted mean yield very similar numbers, while the median-based indexes yield fewer total counties that are statistically different, and in particular fewer counties that are statistically higher than their state index. Finally, the VS-based indexes yield fewer total counties that are statistically different, fewer counties that are statistically lower, but more counties that are statistically higher. Therefore, choosing EMP rather than VS, and choosing (weighted) mean rather than median, makes at least some difference. To illustrate the matter more concretely, I redo the analyses of Tables 5 and 6, using the EMPbased and weighted mean version of the index (Specification #6). Results are summarized and compared in Table 9 . We see that Specification #6 has 43 additional counties that are statistically different from their state, relative to Specification #1. These 898 counties contained nearly 26% of U.S. manufacturing employment in 2002, compared with 21% for the 855 counties in Specification #1. 18 The two These exercises suggest that even though the indexes are very highly correlated with each other, they do tell somewhat different stories in terms of the number of counties different than their state, which counties differ from their state, and even whether a county is statistically higher or lower than its state's index.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The results in this paper suggest that spatial heterogeneity in environmental compliance costs is real. County-level variation is found to explain 11 to 18 times more of the variation in environmental compliance costs than statelevel variation alone. And the range of environmental compliance costs within a state is often large. Using the most "conservative" of the alternative specifications, I find that 34% of counties (containing 21% of U.S. manufacturing employment) have environmental compliance costs that are statistically different from their states'-including many large manufacturing counties. Less conservative but equally defensible specifications yield more dramatic results. All told, there are only three states with counties with homogenous cost index statistically different from the index of their respective state. At the 1% level of significance, Specification #6 has 564 counties, containing 9.3% of U.S. manufacturing employment in 2002, that have an environmental compliance cost index statistically different from the index of their respective state. environmental compliance costs (in a statistical sense). This paper's results suggest that important spatial variation is lost in state-level studies of environmental regulation. The United States' states have long been used as a laboratory to explore social and economic phenomena, including the impact of environmental regulations on industrial location and industrial activity. An index of the sort introduced in this paper could potentially improve such regulatory analyses by expanding the laboratory to include U.S. counties. With such an index, researchers could (re-)explore the effects of environmental regulation on industrial location, employment, output, investment (including foreign direct investment), industrial emissions, ambient pollution levels, and so forth at the county level. An obvious advantage of such an index over the occasionally used county-level NAAQS nonattainment statuses is that it encompasses more than just six air pollutants and is continuous (rather than dichotomous or categorical) in nature.
Future research will be directed toward producing a publicly available county-level index of the sort introduced in this paper. There are a number of issues to consider. There is the matter of which of the six specifications presented here is the most ideal, or whether there is another specification that might be more preferred. Also, the index could (potentially) be improved in at least two ways. First, a separate index could be produced for each of the three pollution media: air, water, and solid waste. Second, an annual county-level index could be estimated. 19 I further discuss this below. Finally, I'll note that confidentiality requirements may limit the ability to release multiple versions of the index, or to make subsequent revisions to the specifications. Therefore, particularly careful forethought is needed in producing and releasing such an index.
Finally, regarding an annual county-level index, while this is certainly conceptually appealing-since environmental regulations may strengthen (or weaken) over time within counties, and at varying rates between counties-a county-year index comes at some cost. Given the observations in the sample, and given confidentiality restrictions, an index value could be published for only about 14,000 county-years, representing just over 1,500 counties. Besides the absence of about 1,600 counties altogether, index values would be absent for some years for many counties. Of the 1,500 counties with at least one publishable index value, the average county would have 9.2 years' worth of values, onequarter of counties would have only 1 to 4 years' worth, and only about 600 would have index values for all 14 years. 20 A more serious sent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed.
